Auto SRI vs No unsafe-inline

Auto SRI automatically adds Subresource Integrity (SRI) attributes to scripts and styles loaded from external sources. This improves security, protects against tampering, and enables strict Content Security Policy (CSP) setups. Features ✔ Adds SRI to all external and tags ✔ Supports WordPress-enqueued assets and raw HTML tags ✔ Supports async, defer, crossorigin, and multiline script tags ✔ Caches all hashes for performance ✔ Excludes admin panel (wp-admin) to prevent conflicts ✔ Automatically skips non-SRI-compatible providers: Google reCAPTCHA Google Fonts (fonts.googleapis.com / fonts.gstatic.com) WordPress.com widgets (widgets.wp.com) Dynamic concatenated resources Dynamic script loaders and runtime-inserted scripts ✔ Safe for Elementor, WooCommerce, CookieYes, Jetpack, GoDaddy hosting, etc. Why some scripts are excluded This plugin automatically excludes: Google reCAPTCHA (google.com/recaptcha) Google Fonts stylesheets (fonts.googleapis.com) Google Fonts font files (fonts.gstatic.com) WordPress.com widgets (widgets.wp.com) Dynamic concatenated resources (/_static/??) Other dynamic inline loaders (CookieYes, wsimg, ywxi, etc.) Want to whitelist a dynamic provider? Contact us at [email protected]. * Other dynamic inline loaders (CookieYes, wsimg, ywxi, etc.) Want to whitelist a dynamic provider? Contact us at [email protected]. These exclusions prevent: CORS failures Integrity mismatch blocking Google reCAPTCHA from breaking Google Fonts from disappearing Layout shifts caused by blocked assets

Content Security Policy (CSP) is a computer security standard introduced to prevent cross-site scripting (XSS), clickjacking and other code injection attacks resulting from execution of malicious content in the trusted web page context. Cross-site scripting (XSS) is a type of security vulnerability that can be found in some web applications. XSS attacks enable attackers to inject client-side scripts into web pages viewed by other users. A cross-site scripting vulnerability may be used by attackers to bypass access controls like the same-origin policy. Looking at National Vulnerability Database run by US NIST, more than 1100 (November 2025) vulnerabilities are reported as XSS for WordPress’ plugins and themes. Keeping your site up-to-date with the latest versions of plugins and themes is the first line of defense to ensure your site’s security. The second thing to do, is to deploy a strict Content Security Policy. The main problem The main problem with Content Security Policies implemented in the real world is that they are too weak to really protect your site and that many of them can be trivially bypassed by an attacker. The proposed solution Google researchers recommend, instead of whole host whitelisting, to activate individual scripts via a CSP nonces approach. In addition, in order to facilitate the adoption of nonce-based CSP, they proposed the ’strict-dynamic’ keyword. The problem(s) with CSP in WordPress Manual creation of a policy Usually, a WordPress project is a mix of code written by different authors who contributed to the Core and or wrote plugins and themes. If it is possible to whitelist every external script loaded from a , the real truth is that in a WordPress project you can have dozens of those scripts included with your plugins and calculate a cryptographic hash for each of them to be included in your CSP header can be a frustrating job. However, there are many browser extensions and WordPress’ plugins that can help you in this job. Inline scripts WordPress core, and plugins, use inline scripts. For these scripts, you can compute hashes to be inserted manually into your policy, only if these scripts do not change at any page load. Unfortunately, this is not very common, as it is frequent to include variable values calculated server side in inline scripts. And it means that your inline scripts change too frequently to manually add their hashes to your policy. This commonly happens when scripts are “localized”. WordPress has no API to implement nonces for CSP Even if it is easy to generate a nonce for each page view, this nonce has to be inserted in every script tag used to embed inline scripts in your page as doWhatever(); and in your script-src directive: script-src 'nonce-rAnd0m'; And, of course, a nonce must be unique for each HTTP response. Unsafe hashes / Inline styles Sometimes, HTML elements as images or buttons use HTML Event Attributes (onclick, onsubmit…) to let events trigger actions in a browser. You cannot use hashes or nonces for script included in event attributes and, adopting a strict CSP, requires refactoring those patterns into safer alternatives or to use ‘unsafe-hashes’. You got a similar problem when inline styles are used in HTML tags: This is a heading This is a paragraph. CSP Level 2 browsers may be ok with just putting the hash in your style-src directive. However, to allow hashes in the style attribute on inline CSS on browsers that support CSP Level 3, you may get an error like this Refused to apply inline style because it violates the following Content Security Policy directive: "style-src 'self' 'sha256-nMxMqdZhkHxz5vAuW/PAoLvECzzsmeAxD/BNwG15HuA='". Either the 'unsafe-inline' keyword, a hash ('sha256-nMxMqdZhkHxz5vAuW/PAoLvECzzsmeAxD/BNwG15HuA='), or a nonce ('nonce-...') is required to enable inline execution. To allow inline styles you need to use ‘unsafe-hashes’ in your style-src directive (that is, in facts, unsafe). ^ This plugin approach This plugin affords those problems in this way: During a capture phase, it detects the scripts, styles and other embedded content present in the pages of your site and stores them in the database. Then you have to whitelist these contents from plugin admin. The plugin uses machine learning to cluster inline scripts trying to aggregate scripts generated by the same server side (PHP) code. So, you can authorize one script example to authorize all scripts that the classifier predicts to label as whitelisted clusters. You can choose to use hashes to authorize external scripts (and the plugin will allow you to include Subresource Integrity in your and ) You can use hashes or nonces to authorize inline scripts. You can ask the plugin to refactor your page to not use event attributes (converted in a inline script) and inline styles (converted in an internal CSS). You can set one or more violations’ report endpoints. The plugin supports multisite installations and has (too) many options documented in inline help. Creating a Content Security Policy After plugin activation, go to Settings menu and search for CSP Settings submenu. The steps you are supposed to do are the following. From the Tools tab, activate the capture of the tags and use your site by visiting all the pages or having your users visit them for a long time long period based on the use of your site (hours or days). From the Tools tab, perform the data clustering in the database (it can use many server resources). Go to the Base rules tab and include in the CSP directives the desired values ​​(help you with the table at the bottom of the page). Go to the external scripts tab, inline scripts tab and scripts invoked by event handlers tab and authorize the execution of all the legitimate scripts present on the pages of your site. Leaving the tag capture active, activate the policy test (at this stage the plugin will generate some violations of the temporary policy used to record additional values to be included in the directives of your “content security policy”). After visiting again your site pages, disable the capture of the tags and repeat the previous steps 2, 3 and 4. Enable site protection. N.B. When you update plugins or themes, if something doesn’t work properly on your site pages, temporarily deactivate the protection and repeat steps 1 to 7. Plugin hooks Filters nunil_output_csp_headers_header_csp nunil_output_csp_headers_header_csp is available since version 1.2.3 and can be used to modify the Content-Security-Policy header before it is sent to browser no_unsafe_inline_not_sri_sources no_unsafe_inline_not_sri_sources can be used to modify the list of external resources that do not support SRI (Subresource Integrity) no_unsafe_inline_final_output no_unsafe_inline_final_output is an internal filter used to manipulate the output of the WordPress process just before the output is sent to the browser. no_unsafe_inline_meta_injector no_unsafe_inline_meta_injector is an internal filter hook used to inject meta http-equiv=”Content-Security-Policy” if variable is set Actions nunil_upgrade Functions hooked on nunil_upgrade will run when the plugin is upgraded nunil_output_csp_headers Functions hooked to nunil_output_csp_headers will run when the plugin output the CSP HTTP response header Code and libraries This version of the plugin uses: * to parse HTML: * ivopetkov/HTML5DOMDocument on PHP 2.13.09 * \Dom\HTMLDocument: The new ext-dom features with HTML5 support on PHP>8.4 * RubixML for machine learning from version 1.1.0 – PHP-ML was used in versions 1.0.x; * opctim/php-nilsimsa to calculate and compare Nilsimsa digests. The log functions have been taken from * perfectyorg/perfecty-push-wp, something you should really try if you want to implement web Push notifications in your site. The complete list of dependencies used in this plugin can be seen in dependency graph on GitHub. Contributions, Issues, Bugs Plugin code is hosted on a public repository on GitHub. Reach me over there to help and suggest.